Three successive colour revolutions (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2005, Kyrgyzstan 2005) led many political analysts to believe that similar developments were about to unfold in other post-Soviet countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The preconditions were in place: enthusiastic and determined opposition, populations discontented with the regimes performance and international backing for change. Yet in the last three years no colour revolution has taken place.
The search for an explanation needs to focus on the specific measures taken by post-Soviet governments to protect the status quo. Their anti-revolutionary measures have been referred to as pre-emptive authoritarianism and comprise a combination of hard and soft power. Soft
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Further measures include the banning of local non-governmental organisations, curbing the activities of international non-governmental organisations, and splitting opposition
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measures include political rhetoric aimed at corrupting any notion of electoral revolution, the use of spin-doctors, think tanks and pro-governmental youth and civil organizations for developing anti-revolutionary measures, control of new and traditional media, and amendment of laws relating to the conduct of elections. Further measures include the banning of local non-governmental organisations, curbing the activities of international non-governmental organisations, and splitting opposition. Hard measures involve training, mobilising and deploying police, army, and intelligence services against revolutionary movements, jailing political opponents, and crushing public protests with violence if necessary.
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Elections in Georgia © OSCE
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The emergence of a conscious strategic response can be traced to the immediate aftermath of the Rose Revolution in Georgia when post-Soviet leaders organised a special meeting in Kiev to discuss joint anti-revolutionary measures to prevent another colour revolution in the region. The meeting was called by the Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma, and was attended by senior representatives of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Igor Ivanov. This union of the post-Soviet regimes directed against electoral revolutions received the name Holy Alliance.
Although these measures did not succeed in saving the Ukrainian or Kyrgyz presidents in 2005, a combination of inter-governmental and national anti-revolutionary measures proved effective in defeating opposition protests against fraudulent elections in Belarus (2005), Kazakhstan (2005) and Azerbaijan (2006). These measures are also actively in operation for upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia 2007-2008 in which the ruling regime hopes to ensure a smooth transition of power to hand-picked successors.
Presidential elections in Belarus on March 19, 2006 represent a text-book example of anti-revolutionary measures carried out on a wide front with the aim of undermining political opposition and civil society. Hundreds of activists were arrested and demonstrations were dispersed. Police powers were enhanced by amendments to the Police Law which granted the president a right to allow the use of firearms by police in peacetime. Belarusian President Lukashenko threatened that any attempt to destabilize the situation will be met with drastic action. We will wring the necks of those who are actually doing it and those who are instigating these acts.
The regime undertook harsh measures against non-governmental organisations. In November 2005 the government adopted amendments to the Criminal Code under which activities by de-registered NGOs could be punished by up to three years in prison. Four key leaders of the
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Lukashenkos regime again demonstrated its brutality and determination to stay in power by any means
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largest election monitoring Partnership were arrested and conducting public opinion surveys without a licence was banned. Contacts with the international community were obstructed and the capacity of the opposition to mobilise large numbers of people was weakened. In March 2006 the police forcefully dispersed opposition rallies, arresting hundreds of people, including the opposition leaders who were subsequently jailed. Lukashenkos regime again demonstrated its brutality and determination to stay in power by any means.
The Belarusian experience has shown that anti-revolutionary measures can dramatically decrease an oppositions ability to protest against fraudulent elections. With upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia in 2007-2008 apparently under the firm control of the Putin regime, political scientists are contemplating whether the model of colour revolutions should now be considered as obsolete.
Misha Kechaqmadze is Volunteer Editor for the OneWorld Georgia Guide
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