Poverty in Somalia

Village community meeting, Baidoa, Somalia (Photo: UNAIDS/L.Taylor)

The absence of a strong central government since the overthrow of the military regime in 1991 has condemned Somalia to constant lawlessness and violence, leaving very little capacity for delivery of any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The lack of meaningful human development data precludes assessment against targets and is the cause of Somalia’s omission from the UN Human Development Index. The dysfunctional economy is dependent almost entirely on remittances from the sprawling Somali diaspora, estimated at over $1 billion pa, together with foreign aid which is predominantly directed to emergency relief rather than development.

Where information is available, the indicators rank Somalia as amongst the worst in the world. For example, although access to primary education is believed to have improved, gross enrolment of boys was only 37% in 2006, with girls trailing at 25%. An MDG progress report published in 2007 assesses adult literacy as below 20%.

Food Security in Somalia

Poor school attendance is caused partly by the nomadic existence of large segments of the Somali population. Almost 70% of the workforce is dependent on subsistence farming or tending livestock. Poverty indicators are therefore vulnerable to the unstable climate conditions experienced in the Horn of Africa region where years of severe drought are punctuated by widespread flooding, a profile likely to be aggravated by climate change. 2008 appears likely to bring a second successive failure of the main gu harvest - cereal production in 2007 was described by the World Food Programme (WFP) as the “worst in 13 years”. The secondary deyr rains at the end of 2007 also failed totally. The result is a food security emergency in the central and south regions of Somalia, with estimates of the numbers requiring assistance undergoing rapid upward revision to 3.5 million by the end of 2008, almost half of the population.

The WFP ship taken by pirates, Somalia © United Nations' Integrated Regional Information Network

Two factors threaten to plunge a hotspot of food insecurity into a humanitarian disaster. First, the global explosion of food prices which squeezes the capacity of poor communities to cope with crop and livestock failures has hit Somalia particularly hard. Aid agencies are reporting price increases of 300% for staples such as rice and maize. Second, the delivery of food aid is seriously obstructed by the anarchic conditions of a conflict zone. The UN has been forced to pass a resolution allowing international naval vessels to enter Somali waters to defend food shipments against rampant piracy. On land, road transport is forced to negotiate its way through the country’s estimated 400 roadblocks, each operated by gun-toting militias demanding arbitrary payment. A tragic development in 2008 has been the targeting of aid workers, culminating in the murder of the acting head of UNDP in July.

These impossibly difficult conditions for delivery of food aid may explain in part the underfunding for the UN’s emergency appeal for $641 million. There is also concern that Somalia has become a forgotten emergency, suffering donor fatigue and media blackout. Meanwhile, the renowned resilience of the Somali people is being tested to the limit with rates of malnutrition exceeding emergency levels - Unicef reports that one in six children under age five has acute malnutrition.
Health in Somalia

Women bring children for health screening © Espen Rasmussen / Medecins sans Frontieres

Drought conditions have also created severe water shortages, forcing household dependence on expensive water tankers for drinking water. In 2006, less than 30% of the population enjoyed access to safe water, a situation which, combined with malnutrition, exceptionally low rates of immunisation and limited protection against malaria, ensures that Somalia has very poor health indicators and high child mortality rates. The maternal mortality rate is over 1,000 per 100,000 live births. As with food security, the continued violence most affects the poorest households, preventing the creation of a viable national health infrastructure. Care may be available only from clan-based local institutions for which fees are often levied. This fragmented structure also precludes efforts to reduce the high instance of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Somalia - 95% of girls in rural areas undergo this traditional practice before the age of twelve, suffering serious potential medical complications.

Somali women leaders at NGO conference - November 2004 © United Nations' Integrated Regional Information Network

By contrast, a national programme of polio vaccination involving 10,000 volunteers coordinated by aid agencies - in response to outbreaks in Mogadishu in 2005 - appears to have been successful. And until recently, the incidence of HIV/AIDS was officially classed as “low level”, comparing favourably with regional experience. However there is concern now about the concentration of the virus amongst high risk groups, especially within the intense activity of ports and border crossings. Amongst the population in general, prevalence is below 1% but AIDS programmes are disrupted by the conflict and the level of awareness of risk behaviours is believed to be very low. Progress with polio and HIV/AIDS has been made possible in part by the determination of hundreds of local NGOs which flourish in Somalia and for which a degree of national coordination has been established.
Politics in Somalia

Mounted gun in Mogadishu © United Nations' Integrated Regional Information Network

The internationally recognised state of Somalia was formed by the merger of a former Italian colony with a British protectorate in July 1960. The new Republic succumbed to a military coup in 1969 led by Mohamed Siad Barre. Having proclaimed Somalia a socialist state, Barre eventually resorted to dictatorial extremes, securing power by dividing the country along clan lines. These internal divisions became so strong that, when Barre was overthrown in 1991, the country descended into lawlessness, split into warring factions. A UN peacekeeping intervention led by American troops faced violent resistance, culminating in the decisive moment on 3 October 1993, when two US Blackhawk helicopters were shot down during a desperate battle in Mogadishu. The following year, US troops were withdrawn from Somalia, with a full UN withdrawal completed in 1995. This humiliation remains a haunting deterrent for any proposal of international intervention.

The power vacuum in Somalia was filled by the unsavoury fiefdoms of Mogadishu warlords, rendering the country a pariah in the international community. The anarchy was eventually arrested during 2006 by the meteoric rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) - a network of courts originally funded by businessmen to bring a degree of law and order to the capital Mogadishu. The defeat of the warlords by urban warfare in June 2006 led to a period of brief stability during which the UIC imposed a moderate form of Sharia law.

Somali President Yusuf Ahmed (center) with aides © Hilaire Avril / United Nations' Integrated Regional Information Network

In parallel to events in Mogadishu, efforts have been under way to return a central administration to power in Somalia. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was set up and based in Kenya, for security reasons. In October 2004, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a former leader of Puntland, was chosen as the interim president. The TFG largely comprises members of the Darod clan and is perceived to be hostile to the Hawiye clan which is dominant in Mogadishu. Unwelcome therefore in Mogadishu, the TFG eventually held its first assembly on Somali territory in the compromise location of Baidoa in February 2006. Its subsequent control has rarely extended beyond about 20% of the country.
Conflict in Somalia

The rapid advance of UIC militia on a defenceless Baidoa towards the end of 2006 prompted fears that Somalia might become an Islamic state, ruled along the lines of the Taliban in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda links - an accusation denied by the UIC. Nevertheless, with his own internal concerns about Islamist influence and apparently the target of a UIC declaration of jihad, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared Ethiopia "technically at war" with the UIC. His invading army routed the Islamists in the space of a few days in December 2006, enabling the transitional government to regain control of Mogadishu.

Somali family displaced by fighting, January 2007 © Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

However, Hawiye and Islamist insurgents regrouped to fight again in Mogadishu, adopting guerrilla tactics. A powerful counter-insurgency led by Ethiopian troops in March and April 2007 resulted in the worst fighting yet seen in Mogadishu, triggering a mass exodus of the population. Unable to execute a swift withdrawal as originally hoped, the Ethiopians have become bogged down in street warfare against al-Shabaab, the military wing of the UIC. Over 8,000 civilians have died since the “invasion” and 700,000 people have been forced to leave their homes in Mogadishu, creating a total of 1.1 million displaced persons in the country. Of these, 300,000 are camped in makeshift tents on the road to the neighbouring town of Afgooye, the densest concentration of internal displacement in the world, living in conditions of appalling deprivation aggravated by the threat of violence.

The role of the US as a funder and strategic partner of Ethiopia has been the subject of much speculation. Explicit military intervention has indeed taken place in attacks by US warplanes and cruise missiles, justified as attempts to kill senior figures from al-Qaeda. One of these attacks killed the leader of al-Shabeeb which has now been designated as a terrorist organisation. Somalia is clearly recognised as the "third theatre" after Iraq and Afghanistan in the "war on terror". The UIC in turn is believed to be supported by Eritrea, an arch-opponent of Ethiopia. Whilst the Somali people have brought much of their suffering on themselves, the presence of two potential proxy wars on their territory illustrates how far the international community has turned its back on this corner of Africa.

The UN has authorised an Africa Union Mission to Somalia (Amison), to be comprised of 8,000 troops belonging to African Union (AU) countries. So far only 1700 Ugandan and Burundian troops have been mustered into a presence which is in any event constrained by the absence of a ceasefire. Ban Ki-moon has speculatively suggested a broader UN peacekeeping force of 27,000 but with little serious intent. His special representative in Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, has been active in negotiating a ceasefire between the government and an opposition grouping known as the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Both sides appear too divided for the agreement to have substance whilst the presence of Ethiopian troops has become a focus of hostility and a barrier to negotiations.
Human Rights and Media in Somalia

Reluctant international intervention also lowers the barrier for protection of human rights in a country of anarchy and war. Human Rights Watch has condemned the violations of all sides in Mogadishu as “war crimes”. Indiscriminate shelling of residential areas has attracted particular criticism.

Since the disintegration of the Somali central government in 1991, journalists and broadcasters within Somalia have struggled to remain objective, either for fear of their lives or for clan lineage. Against the odds, independent journalism maintained a presence, especially in radio which is the most popular medium. The recapture of Mogadishu by the TFG however led to a setback for independent media when three of the most popular radio stations were ordered to omit any coverage of the security situation – several stations have subsequently been closed down. The safety of journalists has plummeted with threats from all sides and the worst incidence of killings since 1991.
Somaliland and Puntland

Somali woman casting her vote © Jamal Abdi / United Nations' Integrated Regional Information Network

Any presentation of the dire humanitarian conditions in Somalia should be qualified by the relative stability that exists in the north-western states of Somaliland and Puntland. Both of these regions have progressed towards elected governments with controlled budgets which enable the compilation of coherent long term development plans. Although both states are affected by the drought, aid delivery is unimpeded. Basic infrastructure destroyed during the years of civil war is undergoing reconstruction. Hospitals and clinics in Somaliland and Puntland are being rebuilt, allowing professionals to return to work, whilst functional educational systems are in place.

After Barre's fall in 1991, Somaliland separated from the union, declaring itself as an independent republic. Although not internationally recognised, Somaliland has conducted its own affairs since then and, despite its tiny national budget of about $50 million, applied to the African Union (AU) in 2006 for recognition of its status. Although the AU acknowledged the request as "an issue that must be addressed", its crucial support has not been forthcoming. In 1998, Puntland declared itself a self-governing province but does not aspire to full independence and has declared that it will become subject to Sharia law. Somaliland's economic health is also believed to be highly dependent on Islamist businesses.

2007 saw a setback for the image of the two breakaway states when their troops clashed over disputed territory of Sool and Sanag, forcing the displacement of 45,000 people. Puntland is also the source of some of the most distressing refugee stories in the world as desperate Somalis seek a passage to Yemen from the town of Bossaso. If discovered and pursued by Yemeni coastguards, the unscrupulous boat owners have been known to force their human cargo overboard to face certain drowning.



The OneWorld Somalia Guide was first published in January 2006 with a text written by Volunteer Editor Jonathan Uglow.

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